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CONFRONTING THE DEAD: THE SUPREME COURT'S (ONFRONTATION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AUTOPSY REPORTS
by ReidR. Allison'
I ihe past decade, the United States Su-
pirmea Court has attempted to overhaul Con-
frontation Clause jurisprudence. Since the
Court's 2004 decision in Crawfordv. Washington,2
it has decided six substantive Confrontation
Clause cases. As with all drastic preceden-
tial overhauls, the Court has injected an over-
whelming amount of uncertainty into ques-
tions of Confrontation Clause legality.' This
article will examine the development of the
Crawford era of Confrontation Clause case law,
with a particular focus on one of the most diffi-
cult but pressing contexts: the admissibility of
forensic reports. In examining these reports,
particular attention will be paid to the looming
question of the admissibility of autopsy reports.
Given the development of the law including
a recent decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit4  the autopsy
1 Thank you to Professor Paul Rothstein, Jessica
Carter, Francis Gieringer, Paul Halliday, Michael Heckler, and
Gabriel Kurcab for their invaluable feedback on drafts of this
article. Thank you to the staff of the Criminal Law Practi-
tioner for their tremendous work toward making this article
what you read today. Thank you to Bill Larson for believing
in me. Thank you also to Professor Steven Goldblatt for his
mentorship throughout law school and Dr. John Rubadeau for
teaching me to write and insisting that his students "scratch
their itch." Finally, I must thank my parents, Cary Rouse and
Chuck Allison, for-literally-everything and my brother,
Kyle Allison, for being a perfect older brother and inspiring
me with his writing.
2 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3 See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), for
the latest decision to fail in providing sufficient, meaningful
guidance.
4 United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir.
2012).
question is very likely to come before the Su-
preme Court within the next five years. After
setting out the current landscape on the ques-
tion in Part I, this article will discuss the signifi-
cant problems with current precedent in Part
II, establish autopsy reports as a worthwhile
case study in Part III, and, in Part IV make pre-
dictions and argue for ways in which the Court
could and should address the autopsy report
question and clarify its Confrontation Clause
precedent in the field of forensic reports.
I. Confrontation Clause Precedent
A. The CrawfordWatershed
In 2004, the Supreme Court was pre-
sented with a relatively run-of-the-mill factual
scenario. A husband and wife gave similar
tape-recorded statements to the police after
the husband was arrested for stabbing another
man." At the husband's trial for assault and
attempted murder, he argued that the stab-
bing occurred in self-defense.' His wife could
not testify under the state's marital privilege
law without his consent, "so the State sought
to introduce [her] tape-recorded statement to
police" that had been recorded the night of
the incident.' The husband argued that such
admission violated his constitutional right to
confront witnesses against him: he would not
have the opportunity to cross-examine his wife
because the state's marital privilege barred her
from testifying. The trial court admitted the
5 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38-39 (2004).
6 Id. at 40.
7 Id.
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recording and the husband was convicted of
assault. After the intermediate appellate court
reversed, the Washington Supreme Court rein-
stated the trial court's verdict.8
Under United States Supreme Court
precedent at the time, Crawford was a relatively
easy case. Ohio .Roberts9 required that the dis-
puted evidence for which the producing wit-
ness's testimony was unavailable have adequate
"indicia of reliability," as established either by
"the evidence fall[ing] within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception," or "a showing of particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness."o In Craw-
ford, the Washington high court found that the
wife's statement included guarantees of trust-
worthiness in that it was identical on the cen-
tral and material points to the separate state-
ment the husband had given police regarding
the stabbing despite varying in certain other
respects." Her statement was potentially in-
criminating because she stated she saw noth-
ing in the victim's hand after the victim was
stabbed, which contrasted with the defendant's
alleged belief that the victim had reached for a
weapon. 12
The Court, however, granted certiorari
on the question of whether Roberts should be
reconsidered. After briefing and argument in
favor of abandoning the Roberts standard from
the defendant, Mr. Crawford," and the United
States as amicus curiae,14 the Court did just
that. Mr. Crawford argued for a per se bar on
the admission of testimonial statements made
by a witness whom the defendant did not have
an opportunity to cross-examine. 5 On the other
8 Id. at 40-42.
9 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
10 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
11 State v. Crawford, 147 Wash. 2d 424, 437-39 (2002).
12 Id.; 541 U.S. at 38-40.
13 Brief for the Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940.
14 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL
22228005.
15 See generally Brief for the Petitioner, Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL
21939940, at *9 (arguing that "the government may not
convict a defendant through any testimonial statements-that
is, statements given in connection with its investigation or
hand, the United States asserted that Confron-
tation Clause is implicated only where a state-
ment is testimonial, and argued against a per se
bar on admission in favor of admissibility when
the statement is inherently reliable. In a quint-
essentially Justice Scalia opinion," the Court
began its analysis by referencing Roman times
and sixteenth century England; this must have
been disconcerting for defenders of Roberts be-
cause of Justice Scalia's previous statements on
the issue.19 After thorough examination of pre-
framing and framing era history, the Court held
that the Confrontation Clause only applies to
"testimonial" statements.2 0 The Court, however,
did not clearly define the parameters of "tes-
timonial," opting instead to "leave for another
day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial.'" 21 It did stress that
"the principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of
ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused," and contrasted these examinations
with "an off-hand, overheard remark" which
"bears little resemblance to the civil-law abus-
es the Confrontation Clause targeted."22  Put
generally, the Court outlined testimonial as "[a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact,"23
prosecution - that have not been (or cannot be) subjected to
cross-examination").
16 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Craw-
fordv. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003
WL 22228005, at *5, 23.
17 Justice Scalia has told at least one interviewer
that Crawford is his "legacy case." See Gatan Gerville-
R6ache, Justice Scalia at the AJEl Summit in New Orleans,
ABAAPPELLATE ISSUES (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/appellate
issues/2013win ai.authcheckdam.pdf.
18 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-44.
19 As early as 1992, Justice Scalia indicated that he be-
lieved the Roberts standard was incorrect based on the history
of the Confrontation Clause. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.)
(proposing that "our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has
evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text
and history of the Clause itself').
20 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-54.
21 Id. at 68.
22 Id. at 50-51.
23 Id. at 51 (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dic-
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and gave, as examples of testimonial evidence
affidavits, custodial examinations ... deposi-
tions, prior testimony, or confessions."24
After determining that a statement's tes-
timonial status was the touchstone of the in-
quiry, the Court held that, w] here testimonial
evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment
demands what the common law required: un-
availability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination." 25  This means that, unless the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the witness who created the testimonial
evidence, that evidence cannot be introduced
without the testimony of that witness. If the wit-
ness is unavailable, then the evidence is inad-
missible. The Court was easily convinced that
the statement at issue was testimonial because
it was the result of police interrogation.26 Con-
curring, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor chastised the Court for "cast[ing] a
mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials
in both federal and state courts" by needlessly
overruling Roberts while refusing to effectively
define what evidence is "testimonial."2' This
fear has been amply borne out by the decade
of subsequent Confrontation Clause tumult
on questions of whether a piece of evidence is
testimonial and how such evidence may still be
admitted without the testimony of the original
record-creator. The concurrence also exempli-
fied how an argument based on "history" can be
turned into support for conflicting positions by
noting that the history points with equal force
to no formal distinction between testimonial
and non-testimonial, testimonial being limited
to sworn statements, and such statements are
not necessarily categorically excluded.28
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment
because they believed that the Supreme Court
of Washington could and should be reversed
tionary of the English Language (1828)).
24 Id. at 51.
25 Id. at 68.
26 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 65-68 (2004)
at 65, 68.
27 Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
28 Id. at 69-74.
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under the Roberts standard. 2 9 The state court
had given decisive weight to the interlocking
nature of the statements and had deemed such
interlocking sufficient indicia of reliability, but
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that such an
argument was foreclosed by Idaho 9. Wright,30
which had held that an out-of-court state-
ment was not admissible at trial simply because
other evidence corroborated its truthfulness."
B. Recent Forensic Report Cases
Five years after Crawford, and after hav-
ing decided two other Confrontation Clause
cases in the interim, 3 2 the Court was presented
for the first time with a Confrontation Clause
issue pertaining to the admissibility of a type
of forensic report. The case, Melendez-Diaz 9.
Massachusetts, " involved a laboratory's chemi-
cal analysis of seized contraband. The analyst
who conducted the chemical test did not tes-
tify at trial; instead, the results were admitted
by way of "certificates of analysis" which the
analyst had sworn to before a notary public. 4
The United States, supporting the respon-
dent Commonwealth, asserted chemical tests
should not be deemed testimonial and there-
fore should be admissible without the testimo-
ny of the laboratory technician who conducted
the test." In support of this proposition, the
United States argued such test results could
not properly be deemed statements because a
machine created the results, which were merely
recorded and authenticated by humans; thus,
29 Id. at 76.
30 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (rejecting the theory that when
co-defendants' respective confessions "interlock" it is determi-
native of the confessions' trustworthiness).
31 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring).
32 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361 (2008)
(holding that unconfronted testimony is inadmissible absent
a showing the defendant intended to prevent a witness from
testifying); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822
(2006) (holding that statements are non-testimonial when
their primary purpose is to assist police in meeting an ongoing
emergency).
33 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
34 Id. at 308.
35 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondent, Melendez- Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305 (2009), 2008 WL 4195142, at *5-7.
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testing machines are not witnesses in the con-
stitutional sense.36  Furthermore, requiring
the technician's testimony would significantly
hamper criminal prosecutions.
The Court was not persuaded. Again,
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and pur-
ported to ground his decision on the bright-
line rule established in Crawford." Justice
Scalia once more asserted that his position was
dictated by history and applied with equal force
to a case whose dispute resolved a scientific
analysis centuries removed from the Founding
era.38 Importantly, Justice Clarence Thomas
provided the deciding fifth vote, but the scope
of his agreement was very limited and came
in a paragraph-long opinion. Justice Thomas
stated, "I join the Court's opinion in this case
because the documents at issue in this case are
quite plainly affidavits."" For Justice Thomas,
only formalized testimonial materials (e.g., af-
fidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confes-
sions) implicate the Confrontation Clause, but
the swearing procedure for the forensic report
in this case rendered it sufficiently formal.40
His represented the narrowest view of 'testimo-
nial' set out in Crawford, 1 and thus rejected the
broader proposition that evidence other than
affidavits or formalized materials may still be
testimonial.42
In dissent, Justice Kennedy joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Jus-
tice Breyer criticized the fact that the formal-
ism of the forensic report cases is founded on a
"history" that could not even fathom the types
36 See id.
37 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329 (stating "[t]his case
involves little more than the application of our holding in
Crawford v. Washington").
38 See id.
39 Id. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that
extrajudicial statements implicate the Confrontation Clause
only when contained in fornalized testimonials).
40 Id. at 329.
41 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-2 (describing the "core"
class of testimonial statements as including affidavits and
other formalized materials).
42 See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 835-
42 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting) (decrying the Court's extension of "testimonial"
status to statements made during a 911 call).
of forensic reports at issue.43  As the dissent
stressed, "laboratory analysts are not 'witnesses
against' the defendant as those words would
have been understood at the framing."44  In-
stead, "witnesses against" contemplated con-
ventional, in-person, eyeball witnesses to
crimes. 4  The dissent reasoned that beyond
being unforeseeable to the Framers lab ana-
lysts could not be considered conventional wit-
nesses because one, analysts record their con-
temporaneous observations and do not rely on
memory as do conventional witnesses; two, the
analyst is ignorant regarding who is accused or
what his or her quantum of guilt may be where
conventional witnesses see a person's identity
and wrongful acts; and three, the scientific pro-
tocol involved in lab tests and reports adds lay-
ers of reliability that do not attach to conven-
tional witnesses.46 Each of these differences
convinced the dissent that the lab analysts of
today were starkly different from conventional
witnesses contemplated by the Framers, both in
terms of their reliability and adversarial nature.
Two years later, the Court was confront-
ed with a similar Confrontation Clause ques-
tion. In Bullcoming 9. New Mexico, the Court
considered a blood-alcohol concentration lab
report the state tried to admit through the tes-
timony of another scientist worked at the same
lab but did not perform or observe the test and
did not sign the certification.4 ' Defense coun-
sel dubbed this "surrogate testimony." 4  The
Court found this report and method of intro-
duction was similar enough to be governed by
43 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 331 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (averring that "[t]he Court's opinion suggests this
will be a body of formalistic and wooden rules, divorced from
precedent, common sense, and the underlying purpose of the
[Confrontation] Clause").
44 Id. at 343 (observing the concerns of treating ana-
lysts as conventional witnesses; for example, the analyst must
be in court for his or her findings to be considered by the jury).
45 Id. at 343-44 (arguing that the Confrontation Clause
applies only to witnesses who have personal knowledge of the
defendant's guilt, not to evidence analysts).
46 Id. at 345-46.
47 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710
(2011) (noting that the New Mexico Supreme Court deter-
mined live testimony of another analyst satisfied the Confron-
tation Clause).
48 Petitioner's Brief, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131
S. Ct. 2705 (2011), 2010 WL 4913553, *10.
26 Washington College of Law Fall 2013
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Melendez-Diaz, and then held that the type of
surrogate testimony attempted here by a "sci-
entist who had neither observed nor reviewed"
the testing technician's work was insufficient
to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.49 Bullcom-
ing did not, however, foreclose the possibility
of acceptable 'surrogate' testimony. Indeed,
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, representing
the necessary fifth vote, seemed to deliberately
pave the way for such testimony to be deemed
sufficient in future cases; she stressed that it
"would be a different case if, for example, a su-
pervisor who observed an analyst conducting a
test testified about the results or a report about
such results."o She also noted, presaging W1il-
liams . Illinois, that this was not a case in which
an expert gave an independent opinion on a
testimonial report that was not itself admitted
into evidence.1
In dissent, Justice Kennedy again
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer,
and Justice Alito noted that his arguments
from Melendez-Diaz applied with equal force
to this case and that other reasons particular to
Bullcoming also weighed against the majority's
decision.52 The dissent lamented that extending
Melendez-Diaz would cause more problems for
state prosecutions and exhaust state resources.53
For example, the dissent noted a 71% increase
in subpoenas for analyst testimony in DUI cases
after Melendez-Diaz, which caused analysts to
have to travel great distances to testify in court
on most working days and hindered laboratory
efficiency and productivity.5 4
The dissent also believed it was unneces-
sary to apply Melendez-Diaz to this case because
of the continued availability of certain safeguards.
One such safeguard was the defendant's abil-
ity to obtain free re-testing of the physical evi-
49 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713 (holding that out-of-
court testimonials may not be introduced against the accused
at trial unless the witness is unavailable and the accused had
the opportunity to confront him or her in the past).
50 Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
51 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
52 See id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 2726-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (detailing
evidence of the heavy burdens imposed on prosecutors as a
result of the Court's Confrontation Clause holdings).
54 Id. at 2727-28.
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dence as well as to subpoena the test-conduct-
ing lab technician to testify."" Additionally, the
defendant benefitted from "testing by an inde-
pendent agency; routine process performed en
masse, which reduce ... targeted bias; and labs
operating pursuant to scientific and profession-
al norms and oversight."" Furthermore, the
dissent decried that "the Crawford line of cases
has treated the reliability of evidence as a rea-
son to exclude it," by concentrating on formal-
ity while formality tends to support reliability,
Crawford and its progeny have determined that
formality of a statement leads to testimonial
status, which in turn leads to exclusion.
Finally, last year, the Court decided its
most recent forensic report case. In Williams 9.
Illinois, the Court considered the admissibility
of expert testimony that was based on a DNA
matching test that had been performed by a lab
technician who did not testify." The testifying
lab technician created a DNA profile of the de-
fendant; the non-testifying technician had test-
ed physical evidence from the rape evidence to
derive DNA material and create a different pro-
file, to which the testifying technician matched
her profile."9 Crucially, the report "was neither
admitted into evidence nor shown to the fact-
finder. [The testifying lab technician] did not
quote or read from the [other technician's] re-
port; nor did she identify it as the source of any
of the opinions she expressed."6o
In an intensely fractured set of opin-
ions, the plurality was comprised of Chief
Justice Roberts along with Justices Kennedy,
Alito, and Breyer the dissenting bloc from
both ielendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. The plural-
ity, authored by Justice Alito, had two founda-
tions for its opinion. First, Justice Alito deter-
mined the testimony was not introduced for the
truth of the matter that is, the veracity of the
DNA test conducted by the non-testifying tech-
nician and thus the Confrontation Clause was
55 Id. at 2726-27.
56 Id. at 2727.
57 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2725
(2011) at 2725.
58 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2223 (2012).
59 See id. at 2229-30.
60 Id. at 2230.
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not implicated." The plurality highlighted the
facts that the testifying technician only testified
to relying on the other lab's DNA profile, made it
clear that she had not conducted the test herself
and could not speak from personal knowledge
to its veracity, and merely properly assumed the
prosecutor's premise regarding the other lab's
DNA profile.62
The plurality also stressed that the re-
port in question was "neither admitted into
evidence nor shown to the factfinder,"" while
in both Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, " [c]riti-
cally, the report was introduced at trial for the
substantive purpose of proving the truth of the
matter asserted."6 4 Furthermore, the fact that
this case was presented before a judge rather
than a jury saved it from potential jury instruc-
tion impossibilities." There was no need to
rely on a jury's understanding and application
of the fact that the DNA expert's testimony was
not to be understood as going to the reliability
of the other technician's DNA profile or its ori-
gin in the physical evidence.
Second, Justice Alito argued that the
Court had only applied the Confrontation
Clause in cases where the statement/report had
"the primary purpose of accusing [a]targeted
individual of engaging in criminal conduct.""
Here, the DNA test of the vaginal swab was not
61 See id. at 2240 (averring that there is simply no way
around the fact that under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause
applies only to out-of-court statements used to establish the
truth of the matter asserted).
62 See id. at 2235-37 (asserting that the lab technician's
presumption was taken as substantive evidence to establish
where DNA profiles came from).
63 Id. at 2230.
64 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2223.
65 See id. at 2236 (proposing that "there would have
been a danger of the jury's taking [the] testimony as proof that
the [other lab's DNA] profile was derived from the sample
obtained from the victim's vaginal swabs. Absent ... care-
ful jury instructions, the testimony could not have gone to the
jury").
66 See id. at 2236-37 (stating that "this case involves
... a bench trial, and we must assume that the trial judge
understood that the portion of .. . testimony to which the dis-
sent objects was not admissible to prove the truth of the matter
asserted").
67 Id. at 2242 (finding that the Confrontation Clause ap-
plies to formalized testimony by witnesses against an accused
that directly links him to the crime alleged).
conducted with a specific suspect in mind the
defendant was not in custody or even under
suspicion for the rape" nor did the conduct-
ing lab have any idea whether the results of the
test would inculpate or exculpate anyone." In
light of these realities, "there was no 'prospect
of fabrication' and no incentive to produce any-
thing other than a scientifically sound and reli-
able profile."o
Justice Breyer concurred to express his
desire that the case be reargued on general
questions of the limit of Crawford."1 Justice
Breyer was (and likely remains) very concerned
with the Court's unwillingness to grapple with
defining what evidence is and is not testimonial
and what factors are involved in this determi-
nation.7 2 He insisted that answering this ques-
tion was of utmost importance in order to give
courts real guidance regarding a massive swath
of their dockets: criminal cases, including those
that involve lab reports." In the absence of re-
argument, Justice Breyer would have held that
the DNA report was not testimonial, because
it was conducted by technicians of an accred-
ited lab who were behind a veil of ignorance
as to the origin of the sample and the purposes
for which the result may be used 4  a rationale
somewhat akin to Justice Alito's targeted crimi-
nal suspect requirement.
Justice Thomas concurred in the judg-
ment (and was the necessary vote for the result)
but did not join the plurality's opinion. As ever,
Justice Thomas's conception of the Confronta-
tion Clause remained the narrowest of the nine
justices as he held that the DNA report in ques-
tion, though admitted here for the truth of the
68 Id. at 2242-44.
69 Id. at 2243-44.
70 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2224 (avowing that the Con-
frontation Clause did not apply because there was no risk of
malice or fabrication in the collection of the scientific evi-
dence).
71 Id. at 2247 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the
various approaches to applying the Confrontation Clause
which would be more compatible with Crawford).
72 See id. at 2244-45 (contemplating "what, if any, are
the outer limits of the 'testimonial statements' rule set forth in
Crawford").
73 Id. at 2248.
74 Id. at 2249-52.
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matter asserted, was not testimonial because
it was unsworn and not otherwise formalized
enough to be testimonial.' Justice Thomas ex-
plicitly disagreed with the plurality's "accusing
a targeted individual" requirement for testimo-
nial status after finding no grounds for it in the
text and history of the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Kagan, writing in dissent along
with Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor,
viewed this case as a straightforward applica-
tion of4elendez-Diaz and Bullcoming,77 going so
far as to ask, "Have we not already decided this
case?"" To the plurality's first argument, the
dissent responded that what the plurality had
signed off on was the functional equivalent of
the surrogacy rejected in Bullcoming namely,
the Court allowed an expert to testify regarding
an inadmissible, Confrontation Clause-defi-
cient fact of which she had no personal knowl-
edge. To the plurality's second argument, the
dissent stated that the "primary purpose" test
had never required particularized suspicion
regarding a targeted individual," there was
no reason to add such requirement,80 and the
Court had faced and rejected similar arguments
of the reliability of forensic reports in 4elendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming." Summing up the opin-
ions, Justice Kagan stated, "What comes out of
four Justices' desire to limit4elendez Diaz and
Bullcoming in whatever way possible, combined
with one Justice's one-justice view of those
holdings, is to be frank who knows what."82
It. Analysis and Critiques of Case Law
As Justice Kagan rightly noted, it is any-
one's guess what will become of Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence in the area of forensic re-
ports; however, this problem existed long before
the Court's decision in W1illiams. In terms of
guidance, a major shortcoming of the Crawford
opinion was that it did almost nothing to define
75 Id. at 2258-61 (Thomas, J., concurring).
76 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2262-64 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).
77 Id. at 2266 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 2267.
79 See id. at 2273.
80 See id. at 2274.
81 See id. at 2274-75 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
82 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2277.
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the parameters of the newly-crowned operative
term, "testimonial." Crawford conceded that
there could be many, widely varying formula-
tions of testimonial." However, as discussed
above, the case did not begin to answer many
important questions. For example, Crawford did
not address whether less formal conversations
with police or statements made before there
is any criminal suspect or even suspicion of a
crime could possibly be deemed testimonial.
Indeed, the Court seemed to leave open that,
beyond the largely undefined "core" of testimo-
nial statements (e.g., affidavits, depositions, pri-
or testimony, etc.), there may be other forms of
statements, which could be deemed testimonial
for Confrontation Clause purposes.8 4  While
the Court certainly could not have conclusively
defined the field regarding the new standard
in the genesis case, its reliance on history as
a crutch has made the forensic report cases
where history has only the vaguest and most at-
tenuated relevance all the more confused.
In the forensic report context, the con-
fusion began with the very first case. Melendez-
Diaz asked whether a report needed formal
swearing to be deemed testimonial. 5 Crawford
seemingly resolved this question by noting that
historically, "the absence of oath was not dis-
positive" and the statement made against Sir
Walter Raleigh, (the "paradigmatic confronta-
tion violation") was unsworn." However, Jus-
tice Thomas was the fifth vote in Melendez-Diaz
and rested entirely on his determination that
the reports at issue were sworn affidavits.
Thus, after Melendez-Diaz, this question
had significant potential ramifications, because
if Justice Thomas's very formal view triumphed
(a dubious proposition considering the con-
trary views of at least seven other justices), the
definition of "testimonial" would have been
quite limited. Perversely, testimonial status could
be avoided by not having certain reports sworn,
and would he very easily dispatched by simply
83 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
84 See id.
85 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527,
2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
86 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
87 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., con-
curring).
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examining the face of the report in question.
Under this regime, much of the subsequent
case law would not have reached the merits
stage in the Supreme Court. However, Bull-
coming dispatched this possibility by holding
that whether a forensic report is sworn or un-
sworn is not determinative in the testimonial
analysis.88
The Court, though, proceeded to leave
open a potentially larger avenue for admission.
Though it struck down the variety of "surrogate
testimony" present in Bullcoming, the majority's
opinion89 as well as Justice Sotomayor's fifth-
vote concurrence, made clear that the surro-
gate theory was not dead. Justice Sotomayor's
opinion leaves the potential parameters of such
testimony completely open to question by stat-
ing, "we need not address what degree of in-
volvement [by a testifying surrogate in the fo-
rensic report at issue] is sufficient."9 0 Justice
Sotomayor's concurrence and the majority's
carefully drafted language arguably left open
potentially acceptable surrogate testimony, in-
cluding: the testimony of a supervisor who has
internal oversight authority for the unavailable
technician who conducted the test; testimony
of a peer or subordinate technician who ob-
served the particular test; and designation of
a lone technician or group of technicians who
would observe the forensic tests and become
experts at testifying as to the reports.
Justice Sotomayor's opinion in Bullcom-
ing also left open two other potential avenues
to avoid Confrontation Clause inadmissibility.
First, she hinted at the possibility that "an ex-
pert witness [being] asked for his independent
opinion about underlying testimonial reports
that were not themselves admitted into evi-
dence," may still be permissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 703,9' which regards bases of
expert opinion testimony. This rationale was
88 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716-
17 (2011).
89 See id. at 2710 (phrasing carefully the question
regarding the testimony of a scientist "who did not sign the
certification or perform or observe the test") (emphasis added);
see also id. at 2712 (phrasing the facts as involving a "scientist
who had neither observed nor reviewed" the test in question).
90 Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
91 Id.
subsequently utilized by the plurality in Wil-
liams, though Justice Sotomayorjoined the dis-
sent in that case.
Second, she noted that the Court may
have decided the case differently if the state
had "suggested ... an alternate primary pur-
pose," such as the blood-alcohol report being
"necessary to provide ... medical treatment."92
This strain of argument remains uncertain after
Williams, as the Court has yet to grapple with
a case in which it finds multiple primary pur-
poses (e.g., one for use in a criminal proceeding
and one for non-criminal reasons). However,
the concept of an "alternate primary purpose"
is arguably internally contradictory as the word
"primary" is defined as "of first rank, impor-
tance, or value,"3 which indicates that there can
be only one truly primary purpose for testimo-
nial evidence. Williams perhaps raises the most
questions of any of the three cases, all while
leaving the surrogacy issue as open as Justice
Sotomayor left it. The jumble of opinions in
this case is incredibly difficult to comprehend,
and it remains somewhat unclear how they will
be read to include or form a coherent precedent
that can be cohesively followed. Regarding
Justice Alito's plurality opinion, it is unclear to
what extent the nuanced and complicated "not
for the truth of the matter asserted" rationale
would apply in a jury trial setting.9 4 Justice Ali-
to made clear that he was relying on the fact
that this was a bench trial to convince himself
that the nuanced admission of the evidence
was fully understood by the finder of fact.95
The legal acumen required in even this rela-
tively straightforward evidentiary issue makes
it appear unlikely that a jury instruction could
92 Id.
93 Primary Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://
www.meiam-webster.com/dictionaiy/priimary (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013).
94 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2236 (proposing that "[t]he
dissent's argument would have force if petitioner had elected
to have a jury trial. In that event, there would have been a
danger of the jury's taking [the lab technician's] testimony as
proof that the [other lab's] profile was derived from the sample
obtained from the victim's vaginal swabs").
95 Id. at 2236-37 (asserting that "this case ... involves
a bench trial, and we must assume that the trial judge under-
stood" for which purposes the evidence was admissible and
for which it was inadmissible) (emphasis in original).
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properly cure potential Confrontation Clause
risks, such as the DNA expert's testimony being
used for the veracity or reliability of the swab
test. Indeed, Justice Alito conceded that such
an argument would have force in the jury trial
context,96 because a jury may not be able to un-
derstand and follow such nuanced (and argu-
ably "factually implausible") legal arguments
even with the most careful of instructions. Ad-
ditionally, even before the Williams opinions
were handed down, commentators who rightly
predicted the outcome stressed that the Court
would need to provide clear guidance on "the
nature and quantum of independent judg-
ment and independent basis which is required
to permit testimony of an expert predicated in
part upon the forensic report compiled by an-
other analyst."98 Unfortunately, the plurality
did no such thing, and these questions remain
as unclear as before.
Of even more potential import is Justice
Alito's second theory namely that the Con-
frontation Clause is only triggered by state-
ments/tests that are elicited or conducted when
law enforcement has a particular target in a
criminal investigation.99 If this rationale were
to find a fifth vote at some point, it could be
of incredible significance not just for DNA test
cases, but also in many autopsy report cases
where the autopsy was conducted before there
was any criminal suspicion at all.
Of course, the woefully unhelpful nature
of these opinions is largely the result of a Court
irreconcilably divided against itself: between
dogged adherence to "history" on the one
hand (exemplified best by Justices Scalia and
96 Id. at 2236 (noting that "absent an evaluation of the
risk of juror confusion and careful jury instructions, the case
could not have gone to the jury").
97 Id. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (asserting that
"the principal modem treatise on evidence variously calls the
idea that such 'basis evidence' comes in not for its truth, but
only to help the factfinder evaluate an expert's opinion 'very
weak,' 'factually implausible,' 'nonsense,' and 'sheer fiction"')
(quoting D. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE
§ 4.10.1, at 196-97 (2d ed. 2011)).
98 Ronald Coleman & Paul Rothstein, Grabbing the
Bullcoming by the Horns, 90 NEB. L. REv. 502, 542 (2011)
[hereinafter Grabbing the Bullcoming].
99 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242-44.
Criminal Law Practitioner A
Thomas) and a more realistic and pragmatic ap-
proach (exemplified by the dissenting bloc of
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Brey-
er, and Kennedy). However, at this point the
Court must be fully aware of this divide, and it
ought to no longer act so cavalierly in this area.
The Court should be especially careful
in granting certiorari in its next Confronta-
tion Clause case granting certiorari without
a willingness to resolve important questions of
law serves neither criminal defendants nor the
state's prosecutions. Rather, it heightens the
degree of unpredictability in each new, slightly
different factual situation. For example, after
Williams, prosecutors may believe they are con-
stitutionally safe where the statement occurred
before there was any criminal suspicion; they
thus may attempt to craft some form of permis-
sible surrogate testimony through a supervisor
or other informed party, or they may argue that
the report in question had an alternate primary
purpose other than preparation for a crimi-
nal trial. Any of these efforts may be perfectly
well intentioned and optimally protective of all
interests involved, and yet it is far from clear
which, if any, would be acceptable.
Part I of this paper will present the most
likely methods for the state to introduce autop-
sy reports without the testimony of the medical
examiner who conducted the autopsy, discuss
the pros and cons of each way forward, and an-
alyze the relative likelihood of success of each
method in the Supreme Court. But first, Part
III will detail the development of Confrontation
Clause as related to autopsy reports and dis-
cuss how this field may provide an opportunity
for the Court to clarify its Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence as applied to forensic reports.
III. Autopsy as Case Study
Autopsy reports are a useful subset
of forensic reports for Confrontation Clause
purposes because they are very important to
a prosecution's case, are typically involved in
cases resulting in death, meaning the public has
the greatest interest in effective prosecution,
and the Supreme Court will likely be dealing
with the question within the next few terms.
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An autopsy report differs materially from al-
most any other forensic report, and certainly
from any the Court has considered. Impor-
tantly, in cases like Melendez-Diaz and Bullcom-
ing, the police have the identity of the crimi-
nal suspect, and he or she is the source of the
physical evidence is tested. On the other hand,
autopsy reports in murder situations are not
always tied to a suspect; instead, autopsies are
performed to establish the cause of death or to
add detail to a police recreation of the incident
that led to the murder. Like the vaginal swab
in Williams, the source of the physical evidence
tested is the victim rather than the perpetrator.
A. The Particular Importance and Unique
Challenges of the Autopsy
The fact that the source of the physical
evidence tested is the victim rather than the
perpetrator is important for both legal and pol-
icy reasons. First, and foremost, it means that
autopsy reports are nowhere near as automati-
cally attached to a swift prosecution and trial
as the types of report present in Melendez-Diaz,
Bullcoming, and Williams. In the first two cases,
once the report was completed, prosecutors es-
sentially had everything necessary to bring a
case against the suspect, and there was little to
no danger of significant delay between the test
and the date of testimony. In contrast, murder
investigations can lay dormant for long periods
of time before a suspect is pinpointed and cap-
tured. In most cases, the existence of the au-
topsy will not further significantly the effort to
discover the wrongdoer; it typically reveals only
the cause of death, not necessarily the iden-
tity of any person who may have contributed
to the death. Second, the above problem is
compounded by the fact that autopsy reports
are not repeatable in the same way that most
other forensic reports are. In the other foren-
sic report cases, the tested evidence is often
preserved and may be retested at a later date.
This availability mitigates some of the
concern that the death of a particular scien-
tist may render vital evidence inadmissible; in-
deed, this has been noted in Melendez-Diazon
100 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.
and Bullcoming.101 Each opinion recognized
that the harsh consequences for prosecutions
attendant to barring introduction of these re-
ports are significantly diminished where the
physical evidence remains available and viable
to be retested and admitted into evidence with
the testimony of the second tester. For exam-
ple in drug test cases, a sample of the drugs are
typically kept through trial so there is physical
evidence to present, and that evidence will not
degrade and may be retested to solve potential
Confrontation Clause problems.
However, the Court correctly observed
that such alternatives are simply not available
when dealing with autopsy reports. 102  This
had led commentators to caution that barring
introduction of autopsy reports could in effect
create a statute of limitations for murder 03 a
patently unacceptable result as indicated by the
fact that states normally do not have a statute of
limitations for murder.104
Finally, of all forensic reports, autopsy
reports may provide the starkest illustration of
how uncertainty in Confrontation Clause doc-
trine can have significantly negative effects on
our system of criminal prosecution. Whereas,
the three cases decided thus far respectively
arose out of serious drug crimes and a heinous
rape, cases in which the prosecution seeks to
introduce an autopsy, as evidence will involve a
criminal act or omission that resulted in death.
These are precisely the kind of crimes for which
the public reserves the utmost condemnation
and prosecutors have the greatest desire and
incentive to prosecute. Because of the impor-
tance of effective prosecution of these crimes,
it is vitally important to establish ways to admit
autopsy reports even when the opportunity to
cross-examine is not available. Such an argu-
101 See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2718.
102 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 (stating that
"[s]ome forensic analyses, such as autopsy reports ... cannot
be repeated, and the specimens used for other analyses have
often been lost or degraded").
103 Grabbing the Bullcoming, supra note 98, at 546
(quoting Carolyn Zabrycki, TowardA Definition of "Testimo-
nial: " How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody the Qualities of
a Testimonial Statement, 96 CAF. L. REv. 1093, 1115 (2008)).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 409
(7th Cir. 2005).
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ment does not inexorably require diminution
or sacrifice of defendant's rights at the altar of
prosecution; rather, it argues in favor of other,
equally-protective procedures beyond cross-
examination that would still allow for introduc-
tion of a properly conducted and recorded au-
topsy report.
On the other hand, autopsy reports may
necessitate detailed testimony more often than
the tests conducted in Melendez-Diaz, Bull-
coming, and Williams. In each of those cases,
the test at issue was conducted by use of so-
phisticated machines according to a rote and
straightforward procedure. These machines,
with minimal input from the humans operating
them, produced a straightforward answer to a
relatively simple question. 10 In Melendez-Diaz,
the machine revealed whether the substance
was an illegal drug; in Bullcoming, the machine
showed whether the defendant's blood alcohol
concentration above the legal limit; in Williams,
it revealed whether there was a DNA match.
Less simple and straightforward, autopsies
rely heavily on the expertise and experiential
inferences of the conducting medical examin-
er. Furthermore, autopsies do not necessar-
ily produce a definitive or simple answer to the
question of cause of death. This counterargu-
ment counsels in favor of having the conduct-
ing examiners testify whenever it is reasonably
feasible. However, the complexity of autopsies
should not be subject to the draconian bar the
Court has erected to admission, when, for ex-
ample, the conducting examiner has died in the
interim or his or her whereabouts are actually
unknown to the prosecution. Murder pros-
ecutions and the centrality of autopsy reports
to them are simply too important to be left to
the happenstance of when a suspect is found
and prosecuted, let alone the significant risk of
a material change in the circumstances of the
105 But see Paul F. Rothstein & Ronald J. Cohen, Wil-
liams v. Illinois and the Confrontation Clause: Does Testimo-
ny by a Surrogate Witness Violate the Confrontation Clause,
at n. 1, (Dec. 6,2011), available athttp://scholarship.law.george-
town.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1740&context=facpub
(noting, in a piece featuring a debate between the authors, the
myriad complications that can arise even with mechanical fo-
rensic testing, and arguing that forensic testers have their own
self-interest, namely, to prove that theirjob requires significant
expertise and machines do not do the lion's share of the work).
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medical examiner who conducted the autopsy.
Examples abound of the unavailability of medi-
cal examiners from retirement, significant
moves, 106 medical conditions,0 7 or death and
the fact that many murder prosecutions take
place years after the autopsy is conducted only
heightens these risks.
In analyzing this issue, the current legal
backdrop (including the ebbs and flows follow-
ing each Supreme Court decision) of the au-
topsy issue will be examined.
Finally, this article will suggest possible
methods for introducing such evidence with-
out the testimony of the medical examiner that
conducted the autopsy.
B. Post-Crawford Autopsy Case Law
Two years after Crawford overhauled
the Confrontation Clause analysis, the Second
Circuit confronted the newly important ques-
tion of whether autopsy reports are testimonial
such that they must be barred in the absence of
cross-examination of the conducting medical
examiner.108 In UnitedStates . Feliz, the Second
Circuit panel confronted a case in which nine
autopsy reports had been admitted in a homi-
cide prosecution without the testimony of the
conducting medical examiner. The defendant
had run a violent drug distribution organiza-
tion, but the autopsies were conducted without
targeting a specific individual for suspicion.
On appeal of his conviction, the defendant did
not challenge the District Court's decision that
the autopsy reports were admissible as busi-
ness records. 109 Instead he argued that Craw-
ford rendered the autopsy reports inadmissible
as testimonial evidence submitted without the
opportunity to cross-examine the medical ex-
aminer that had conducted the autopsies and
106 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 740 F. Supp. 2d
4, 6 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting autopsy-conducting medical exam-
iner had moved overseas).
107 See, e.g., Nardi v. Pepe, 662 F.3d 107, 109 (1st Cir.
2011) (explaining that the autopsy-conducting medical exam-
iner had retired to Florida and could not testify at trial due to a
medical condition).
108 United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 229 (2d Cir.
2006).
109 Id. at 230.
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drafted the reports. The panel first found that
"the sole relevant inquiry under the Confron-
tation Clause is whether the autopsy reports
are testimonial,"1 0 and that labeling the reports
as a business record without inquiry into testi-
monial status would not be sufficient."
The Second Circuit then held that a
properly admitted business record "cannot be
testimonial because a business record is funda-
mentally inconsistent with what the Supreme
Court has suggested comprise the defining
characteristics of testimonial evidence."1 12 In
reaching this conclusion, the panel reasoned
that business records "cannot be made in an-
ticipation of litigation" and thus "bear[] little re-
semblance to the civil-law abuses the Confron-
tation Clause targeted."" In holding that the
autopsy reports were not testimonial, the panel
noted that the reports were "reports kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activ-
ity; the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
of New York conducts thousands of routine au-
topsies every year, without regard to the likeli-
hood of their use at trial."114
Interestingly (particularly after Wil-
liams), the court admitted, "Certainly, practical
norms may lead a medical examiner reasonably
to expect autopsy reports may be available for
use at trial, but this practical expectation alone
cannot be dispositive on the issue of whether
those reports are testimonial.""" The panel
justified this apparent logical conflict by stating,
"Given that the Supreme Court did not opt for
an expansive definition that depended on a de-
clarant's expectations, we are hesitant to do so
here."" In light of subsequent Confrontation
Clause precedent particularly the develop-
ment of the "primary purpose" inquiry11  the
110 Id.
111 Id. at 233-34, n.4.
112 Id. at 233-34.
113 Id. at 234 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 50 (2004)).
114 United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir.
2006) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
115 Id. at 235.
116 Id. at 236.
117 See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305, 312 n. 12 (2009) (excluding "medical reports created for
Second Circuit's admission that parties would
reasonably expect autopsy reports to be used at
trial could be fatal to this rule's continued vital-
ity, as this statement tends to indicate that the
primary purpose of autopsies in homicide cases
is for use in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
The First Circuit also addressed the
question after Crawford but before Melendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming "' InDeLa Cruz, the panel
was confronted with a challenge to the admis-
sibility of an autopsy in a case in which drug
distribution allegedly resulted in the death of
one of the drug buyers."' The testifying medi-
cal examiner had not conducted the autopsy
in question, but rather based his testimony on
the autopsy report, crime scene photographs,
and a general review of the whole investigative
record. 120 The court agreed with the Second
Circuit reasoning, "[A] n autopsy report is made
in the ordinary course of business by a medi-
cal examiner who is required by law to memo-
rialize what he or she saw and did during an
autopsy;" the report thus was admissible as a
non-testimonial business record. 12 1
The business record exception noted
in and relied on (to varying degrees) by Feliz
and De La Cruz no longer ends the analysis, as
the Melendez-Diaz Court made clear. There, the
Court asserted, "Business and public records
are generally admissible absent confronta-
tion not because they qualify under an excep-
tion to the hearsay rules, but because having
been created for the administration of an en-
tity's affairs and not for the purpose of estab-
lishing or proving some fact at trial they are
not testimonial." 122  The Feliz reasoning may
retain some life because it relied on the Su-
preme Court's general interpretations of "tes-
timonial" rather than the blanket business re-
treatment purposes" from testimonial status); Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (hinting that a primary purpose argument could
have rendered the blood alcohol report non-testimonial).
118 United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121 (1st Cir.
2008).
119 Id. at 125-27.
120 Id. at 132.
121 Id. at 133 (asserting that "business records are ex-
pressly excluded from the reach of Crawford").
122 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324.
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cord exception used by the First Circuit, which
the Melendez-Diaz passage specifically sought
to clarify. The Feliz court noted that merely
labeling evidence as a business record was not
sufficient to exclude it from testimonial sta-
tus, and it instead embarked on a searching
discussion of what the Supreme Court meant
by "testimonial" and how it applied to autop-
sies. For this definitional argument to retain
any strength, a reviewing court would have to
distinguish autopsy reports from the chemical
test conducted in Melendez-Diaz and the blood
alcohol concentration test from Bullcoming, be-
cause each of those varieties of forensic reports
have clearly been deemed testimonial. How-
ever strong Feliz may be in a broad legal sense,
it may be undermined on its facts, because the
autopsies were conducted following homicides
and, as noted above, were likely carried out for
the primary purpose of providing evidence at a
future trial. Autopsy reports in this context are
likely testimonial.
Early last year, the Eleventh Circuit ad-
dressed the autopsy question with the added
benefit of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.123 Ignasiak in-
volved a doctor convicted of illegally dispens-
ing controlled substances. Autopsy reports had
been admitted some with and some without
the testimony of the conducting medical ex-
aminer to show that the doctor was provid-
ing controlled substances in unnecessary or
excessive quantities without a legitimate medi-
cal purpose and that such dispensation had re-
sulted in the deaths of some of his patients.124
The autopsy reports were performed
pursuant to Florida state statute and were car-
ried out before the investigation into the doc-
tor's practice began. 1 25 The court relied heav-
ily on Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming to issue
blanket statements such as "forensic reports
constitute testimonial evidence," and "the sci-
entific nature of forensic reports does not jus-
123 United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir.
2012).
124 Id. 667 F.3d at 1219.
125 See generally Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee United
States, United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir.
2012), 2009 WL 5635077.
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tify subjecting them to lesser scrutiny."12 6 The
court then looked to the state's autopsy statute
to bolster the proposition that autopsy reports
in Florida are testimonial. Most notably, the
court considered certain reporting require-
ments between law enforcement and medical
examiners1 27 that may not exist in the same way
in every jurisdiction.
Finally, cutting back in the non-testimo-
nial direction, the Supreme Court of Illinois
recently decided that an autopsy was non-tes-
timonial and admissible without the testimony
of the conducting medical examiner.128  The
court examined a case in which an autopsy re-
port was introduced, without the testimony of
the medical examiner, to help prove intention-
al homicide after the defendant had admitted
to killing his wife but claimed it was an acci-
dent. 129 When the autopsy was conducted, the
state had criminal suspicion and a particular,
targeted suspect. The court detailed the signifi-
cant rift in authority between the states on this
question, but determined that the autopsy in
this case was not testimonial. First, the court
noted that autopsy reports are "not usually pre-
pared for the sole purpose of litigation,"130 and
the "primary purpose of preparing an autopsy
report is not to accuse a targeted individual
of engaging in criminal conduct.""' Next, the
court contrasted the autopsy with a DNA match
in stating that "the autopsy report did not di-
rectly accuse [the] defendant." Other evidence
was required to tie the defendant to the par-
ticular body; all the autopsy proved was that
the death was in fact a homicide.1 32 Even in
cases where "the police suspect foul play and
the medical examiner's office is aware of this
suspicion, an autopsy might reveal that the de-
ceased died of natural causes and, thus, exon-
126 Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1230.
127 Id. at 1231-32 (citing Fla. St. § 406.13, which
requires the medical examiner to "notify the appropriate law
enforcement agency" upon receipt of a dead body to be autop-
sied).
128 People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570 (Ill. 2012).
129 Id. at 572-73.
130 Id. at 592.
131 Id. (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. at 2242
(2012) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
132 Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 592.
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crate a suspect."' Finally, the court advanced
an imminently reasonable, though almost en-
tirely pragmatic, rationale: "the potential for a
lengthy delay between the crime and its pros-
ecution could severely impede the cause of
justice if routine autopsy reports were deemed
testimonial merely because the cause of death
is determined to be homicide."1 34 The Illinois
Supreme Court's holding in People v. Leach is
not terribly convincing. It leans heavily on the
Williams' plurality "targeting" rationale even
though that rationale did not win five votes in
the United States Supreme Court. Furthermore,
in Leach, there was a targeted individual the
husband when the autopsy was conducted.
What Leach will likely do, though, is speed up
the development of Confrontation Clause ques-
tions regarding autopsies in the lower courts,
and may ultimately encourage the Supreme
Court to clarify the issue.
As of the time this article was written,
Missouri,3 " Texas,' and the Eleventh"' and
D.C."' Circuits have held that autopsy reports
(conducted under the circumstances set out in
the corresponding footnotes) are deemed testi-
monial for Confrontation Clause purposes. On
the other hand, as discussed above, Illinois and
the First and Second Circuits appear to hold that
autopsy reports are not testimonial, relying on a
business record rationale that may be on shaky
footing afterielendez-Diaz andBullcoming. De-
pending on how the Supreme Court approach-
es the issue, these decisions could be reconcil-
able; however, if the Court seeks a categorical,
bright-line rule, rather than a case-by-case de-
termination, it will have to choose between the
two alternatives put forth by the lower courts.
133 Id. at 591.
134 Id. at 592.
135 State v. Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2007) (holding that autopsy performed at request of law
enforcement is testimonial).
136 Martinez v. State, 311 S.W.3d 104, 111 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2010) (holding that autopsy at which law enforcement
took pictures and which was conducted pursuant to statute
because death was suspected to be caused by unlawful means
was testimonial).
137 Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1229-30.
138 United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 73 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (holding autopsy requested by law enforcement and at-
tended by law enforcement to be testimonial).
IV Analysis and Possible Ways Forward
This article proposes that the Confron-
tation Clause holdings are trending in the
wrong direction. Melendez-Diaz and Bullcom-
ing appear to have convinced some courts that
all varieties of forensic reports are testimonial,
regardless of the actual circumstances or the
comparable import of the reports. Indeed,
even in Second Circuit trial courts, where Feliz
remains good law, there is uncertainty about its
continued vitality after Melendez-Diaz and Bull-
coming.'39 Leach, the recent Illinois decision,
will likely spur further development of the is-
sue in state and federal courts, eventually lead-
ing to a well-defined split of authority involving
many jurisdictions, making it ripe for Supreme
Court review.
There are a few ways forward when the
Court is eventually confronted with the issue.
First, it is important to separate the potential
situations in which autopsy reports may be in-
troduced. This is necessary, because the legal
grounds for admitting autopsy reports may di-
verge significantly between the three broadly
framed groups of cases. These three situations
are: one, cases in which the autopsy is conduct-
ed without particularized criminal suspicion,
but is conducted instead under a non-criminal
provision of a state's autopsy statute (e.g., Igna-
siak); two, cases in which law enforcement have
criminal suspicion but no suspect (e.g., Feliz);
and three, cases in which law enforcement have
criminal suspicion and a suspect prior to or
contemporaneous with the autopsy (e.g., Leach
and DeLa Cruz).
The Eleventh Circuit in Ignasiak suf-
ficiently illustrated the first set of cases. In a
non-homicide context, this case provides a per-
fect example of how harmful a strict and unre-
flective application of the Confrontation Clause
to bar the introduction of autopsy reports can
be. There is a strong argument that such an
autopsy report is not testimonial. Autopsy re-
ports conducted in cases before there is suspi-
cion of any criminal wrongdoing are typically
conducted pursuant to state law requiring au-
139 See, e.g., Vega v. Walsh, 2010 WL 2265043, *4
(E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2010).
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topsy reports in certain situations even before
any sort of criminal component exists. State
statutes provide many reasons to conduct au-
topsies that extend well beyond obvious cir-
cumstances of criminal wrongdoing.140 In each
of the state statutes listed below that provide for
autopsy in the public interest or at the discre-
tion of the medical examiner, there are alterna-
tive grounds for explicit criminal suspicion-re-
lated autopsies, including autopsies conducted
at the request of the prosecutor's office. Clearly,
then, there is significant room in state statutes
for autopsies to be conducted in cases with-
out criminal suspicion. If the autopsy reports
were conducted years before the underlying
criminal investigation even began, it strains
credulity to claim that the autopsy reports were
somehow conducted with a primary purpose
for use in litigation. To adopt this broad of an
interpretation would mean that every single
case would involve a testimonial statement; in
an ex post view, if the prosecution attempts to
140 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.65.020(a) (providing for
autopsy where the medical examiner determines that the death
occurred under circumstances that warrant investigation); ARIz.
REV. STAT. § 11-597 (providing for autopsy when medical ex-
aminer determines it is in public interest); ARK. CODE § 12-12-
315(a)(1)(A) (providing myriad reasons for autopsies beyond
criminal suspicion); CAL. Gov. CODE § 27491 (providing myr-
iad reasons for autopsies beyond criminal suspicion)); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-406 (same); DEL. CODE § 4707(b) (providing
for autopsy in the public interest); D.C. Code § 5-1409(b)
(same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 841-14 (same); IDAHO CODE § 19-
4301B (same); IND. CODE § 36-2-14-6 (providing for autopsy
in non-criminal situations where the medical examiner deems
an autopsy necessary); IOWA CODE § 331.802 (providing for
autopsy in the public interest, including many enumerated
non- criminal circumstances); KAN. STAT. § 22a-233 (providing
for autopsy where coroner deems one necessary); MAINE REv.
STAT. § 3028(8) (providing for autopsy in the public interest);
MASs. GEN. LAWs 38 §§ 3(1)-(19), 4 (providing for notification
and autopsy in myriad non-criminal contexts); MINN. STAT. §
390.11 (providing for autopsy in the public interest, including
many enumerated non-criminal circumstances); Miss. CODE
§§ 41-61-65(1), 41-61-59 (same); N.H. REV. STAT. 611-B:17
(providing for autopsy where medical examiner deems one
necessary); N.J. STAT. 52:17B-88 (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
130A-389(a) (providing for autopsy in the public interest); 63
OKLA. STAT. § 944 (same); TENN. CODE §§ 38-7-108, 38-7-109
(providing for notification and autopsy in myriad non-criminal
contexts); UTAH CODE § 26-4-6 (providing for autopsy where
medical examiner deems on necessary); VA. CODE § 32.1-285
(providing for autopsy in the public interest); W.V CODE § 61-
12-10 (same).
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introduce the evidence, the evidence must be
intended for litigation, rendering it testimonial
and therefore barred, absent the testimony of
the party who created the evidence.
The second set of cases, where there is
criminal suspicion but no targeted individual,
is left somewhat indeterminate after Williams.
This confusion comes from the distinction
between Justice Alito's view that the lack of
a particularized suspect renders a report non-
testimonial14 ' and the dissent's view that
only a primary purpose for use in litigation,
rather than in litigation against a particular
suspect, is required to render a report testi-
monial. 1 42 Going forward, the latter argument
seems more likely to prevail. Indeed, arguably,
it did prevail in Williams itself because Justice
Thomas seems to have joined the dissent on
this point.143 Accordingly, this variety of autop-
sy reports is most safely dealt with in the same
way as the third and final variety.
The third set of cases, exemplified by
Leach and De La Cruz, are those in which there
is both criminal suspicion and an actual sus-
pect, and these are probably the most straight-
forward. Any argument that such an autopsy
was not testimonial i.e., was not conducted
with the primary purpose of use in criminal
prosecution is unpersuasive. Under current
Supreme Court precedent, neither the second
nor third variety of autopsies would be admis-
sible without the testimony of the conduct-
ing medical examiner. Even so, as discussed
above, there are compelling reasons why the
Court should be receptive to different ways of
introducing the evidence found in an autopsy
report so long as the means of admission pro-
tects defendants' interests as well as (or bet-
ter than) cross-examination. Here, I suggest
three potential methods of introducing autopsy
141 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2242 (2012).
142 Id. at 2273-74 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
143 See id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(arguing that the plurality's targeted primary purpose test
"lacks any grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in
logic"); see also id. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("Justice
Thomas rejects the plurality's views for similar reasons as I do,
thus bringing to five the number of Justices who repudiate the
plurality's understanding of what statements count as testimo-
nial.").
Fall 2013 Washington College of Law 37
15
Allison: Confronting the Dead: The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause Ju
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
Criminal Law Practitioner
reports of the second and third variety, which
could each apply equally to the first variety if
the non-testimonial argument fails.
First, the possibility of surrogate testimo-
ny remains alive, though perhaps not "well.""'
After Bullcoming particularly in light of Jus-
tice Sotomayor's concurrence it seems any al-
lowable surrogate testimony would have to be
closely tied to the examiner who conducted the
autopsy. If the testifying witness had in fact
observed or supervised the autopsy in ques-
tion, it is likely that the Court would be satis-
fied with his or her testimony. One possibility
for jurisdictions with available resources would
be to videotape the examination room. It ap-
pears that at least Florida,1 45 Indiana,"14 North
Carolina,1 4 ' North Dakota,148 and South Caro-
lina149 already contemplate photography and
videography to some degree during autopsies.
In so doing, the jurisdiction would provide a
means of admission where testimony is needed
but the conducting examiner is not available
for whatever reason. Another member of the
same lab would be able to view the autopsy af-
ter the fact in much the same way as if he or she
had been present during the autopsy, and this
viewing would then qualify the examiner to tes-
tify as a proper surrogate. This route has the
virtue of simplicity and efficiency, as it preserves
resources and medical examiners' time. In the
vast majority of autopsy reports, no future tes-
timony will be required, so it would be an in-
credible burden to require contemporaneous
144 See, e.g., Grabbing the Bullcoming, supra note 98, at
545-46.
145 See FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (providing for disclosure of
autopsy video and/or audio recordings to certain parties).
146 See IND. CODE 16-39-7.1-3 (providing for disclosure
of autopsy video and/or audio recordings to certain parties).
147 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-389.1 (entitled "Pho-
tographs and video or audio recordings made pursuant to
autopsy").
148 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18.18 (providing for
disclosure and use of autopsy photographs or videos to certain
parties for particular reasons).
149 See S.C. CODE § 17-5-535 (providing for disclosure
and use of autopsy photographs or videos to certain parties for
particular reasons, including for use by the prosecutor's office
in pressing charges).
observation by another examiner during each
autopsy just in case examiner testimony were
later needed at trial. Video also allows the lab
to avoid having to guess which exams may re-
sult in evidence that will be necessary for later
prosecutions.
This solution would also likely provide
for even better cross-examination fodder than
would the testimony of the conducting exam-
iner were he or she to proceed without the
benefit of the videotape. Medical examiners
conduct hundreds of autopsies per year and it
is incredibly unlikely that an individual medi-
cal examiner will remember anything about a
single autopsy conducted months (or longer)
before. Instead, any examiner who testifies
without the aid of video would likely testify
as to what the report says and would claim to
have followed typical lab protocol neither of
which provides much fruit for cross-examina-
tion. Indeed, cross-examination in many cir-
cumstances is unlikely to effectively protect a
defendant's rights.15 o With or without the abil-
ity to cross-examine, the best possible forensic
evidence will only come through rigorous labo-
ratory accreditation standards, vigilant internal
oversight, and inquisitive public organizations.
To the extent that the Court can incentivize or
bolster these three things, it should, but they
are best addressed through legislation, fund-
ing, and public scrutiny.
Second, and perhaps more likely to suc-
ceed in the Court, the prosecution could at-
tempt the Williams form of introduction. In
short, the prosecution could have an expert tes-
tify regarding the cause of death after reviewing
the autopsy report without attempting to intro-
duce the report itself. Such testimony would
be the expert's own opinion, and it should not
be allowed to be used as an end-run around
the Confrontation Clause." That is to say, a
150 See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2250 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (noting the ineffectiveness of cross-examination
to root out faulty evidence, and citing studies, concluding that,
" [i]n the wrongful-conviction cases to which this Court has
previously referred, the forensic experts all testified in court
and were available for cross-examination").
151 See id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (cautioning
that this approach would "allow prosecutors to do through
subterfuge and indirection what we previously have held the
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court must be satisfied that the testimony was
introduced as a permissible expert opinion
relying on foundational, though inadmissible,
evidence, rather than for the truth of the matter
asserted.
Similar to the surrogacy option, the per-
missible scope of such a procedure is unclear.
All that is known is that the report itself could
not be admitted, and that the expert's testi-
mony as it directly pertains to the report could
not be introduced for the truth of the matter
asserted. Defense counsel will undoubtedly
argue that an autopsy report is more nuanced
than the simple "does this 'match' in your ex-
pert opinion" presented in Williams regarding
DNA matching. This added complexity may
confuse the jury and perhaps render a saving
jury instruction impossible. The complexity
also may undermine the expert's ultimate opin-
ion since he or she is only operating from the
written notes of the conducting medical exam-
iner. These types of arguments could force the
Court to confront more directly the parameters
of expert opinion admissibility under the Con-
frontation Clause, where it is based on forensic
reports.
Another significant and, perhaps, fatal
concern with the admission of such testimony
is that it is not clear that it sufficiently protects
defendants' rights. Unlike the video option pre-
sented above, the defendant is not afforded an
opportunity to confront the specially-informed
examiner (i.e., one who has reviewed the tape
of the report in question) and instead is stuck
with the worst possible scenario: an expert who
relies entirely on the report itself, without any
requirement of personal knowledge as to the
lab in question, the conducting examiner, or
how the particular autopsy report was created.
Furthermore, though the report itself is osten-
sibly not admitted, as the discussion above (as
well as the discussion in Williams) makes clear,
it is nearly impossible to disentangle assump-
tions about the veracity and reliability of the
substance of the report from jury's minds once
it has been discussed, even tangentially, by the
Confrontation Clause prohibits").
Criminal Law Practitioner
expert. Accordingly, the video option is far su-
perior, and the Court should be very reluctant
to expand the first theory of Williams to other
contexts.
Finally, there is the least realistic (from
a current "five-votes" perspective) but poten-
tially appealing proposition raised very briefly
by Justice Breyer in Williams. He argued that
there might be room for state regulation where
the evidence at issue is not particular testimo-
nial statements that occupy a "constitutional
heartland" described by Crawford.1 2 In par-
ticular, he argued "the states could create an ex-
ception that presumptively would allow intro-
duction of DNA reports from accredited crime
laboratories." However, this presumption
would vanish where "there [is] significant rea-
son to question a laboratory's technical compe-
tence or its neutrality."5 3 Though it is unclear
to what extent his argument was conditioned
on a determination that DNA profiles were not
testimonial, his brief argument arguably distin-
guished between "core" testimonial and other
testimonial evidence, and states could regulate
the latter. It is also unclear whether Justice
Breyer would expand this practice beyond DNA
laboratories. Despite the uncertainties, there is
much to support Justice Breyer's idea.
If done properly, both prosecutors and
defendants could benefit from this approach.
First, prosecutors would appreciate clarity and
ease of introduction of often- vital forensic evi-
dence, as compared to the current uncertain
approach. There would be no danger of the
court flatly barring important evidence; rather, it
would be introduced when the testing lab lived
up to the accreditation standards. If the lab did
not, the prosecution would still have an oppor-
tunity to present testimony sufficient to intro-
duce the evidence. Additionally, lab accredita-
tion and monitoring would not unduly burden
the state from a resource perspective, because if
a state chooses to operate its own labs there can
be no argument of unfairly draining resources.
The labs would simply be required to meet the
standards of good practice established by stat-
152 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2248 (Breyer, J., concur-
ring in judgment).
153 Id.
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ute and upheld by courts.
Defendants, on the other hand, would
have a better way to attack the reliability of
technicians and tests than cross-examination.
In making the argument for cross-examination,
defendants have pointed out the many exam-
ples of labs around the country that have sig-
nificant internal problems regarding storage,
labeling, and testing of physical evidence.15 4 In
Melendez-Diaz, amici argued that cross-exami-
nation is necessary because "forensic laborato-
ries are not even required to maintain accredi-
tation with a standard-bearing organization."5 5
If accreditation were required, stringent, and
closely monitored, defendants and defense
counsel should be pleased.
Though this approach is certainly un-
realistic with the current composition of the
Court, developments in the next few presiden-
tial terms may change the outlook. The Court's
current quagmire on Confrontation Clause
questions in forensic report cases is largely
traceable to Justice Scalia: by authoring the
majority in Crawford he took the Court away
from reliability concerns, and by authoring the
opinion in4elendez-Diaz (the first of the foren-
sic report cases) he arguably enlarged the Con-
frontation Clause beyond its bounds,5 firmly
entrenching forensic reports in the uncomfort-
able, unclear, and unwieldy position of having
"testimonial" status. Sometime within the next
decade, Justice Scalia will likely leave the Court.
As he does, he will leave behind at least Justices
Kagan and Sotomayor, who voted with him in
Bullcoming. But neither of these Justices seems
likely to take up the banner for the formal, "his-
torical" approach that Scalia championed. If
Justice Thomas has also left the bench (or if
154 See generally, Brief for National Innocence Network
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), 2008 WL 2550614.
155 Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Melen-
dez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), 2008 WL
2550612 at *8.
156 See, e.g., felendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 346-47 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority, without any
reasoning or supporting authority, stretched the Confrontation
Clause beyond the "conventional witnesses" to which it was
meant to apply).
he is unable to marshal four votes on divisive
issues), the Court may make a significant shift
in its forensic report Confrontation Clause ju-
risprudence. Justice Breyer's suggestion, if
fleshed out and properly implemented, could
satisfy both prosecutor-friendly pragmatists
(particularly Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito) and defendant-friendly Justices (Justices
Kagan and Sotomayor). Combined with the
fact that any new Justices are very unlikely to
be as chained to "history" as Justice Scalia, Jus-
tice Breyer's suggestion could presage what a
differently-comprised Court will do long term.
V Conclusion
The Supreme Court should temper its
approach to granting Confrontation Clause
cases as long as it retains an unwillingness (or
inability) to answer important questions of law
and give sufficient guidance to the criminal
justice system. The current state of the law,
after Williams a case with no apparent major-
ity opinion" is untenably vague, confusing,
and uninformative for prosecutors, defendants,
and trial judges. But this should not persuade
the Court to continue making it worse before it
makes it better.
Within the next few terms, the Court may
be confronted with an opportunity to clarify or
put an outer bound on Confrontation Clause
questions when it addresses what to do with
the admissibility of autopsy reports. In addi-
tion to the rationale of maintaining stability in
the legal process, there is ample reason for the
Court to hold that autopsy reports are not tes-
timonial or that they may be admitted without
the conducting examiner's testimony. The most
significant hurdle to this holding is the 'histori-
cal' wing of the Court, and its complete lack of
interest in pragmatic considerations. At least
one commentator has cautioned against the
strict historical approach to autopsy questions
regarding autopsy reports.5 The historical ap-
157 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissent-
ing) (stating "[i]n the pages that follow, I call Justice Alito's
opinion 'the plurality,'because that is the conventional term
for it. But in all except its disposition, his opinion is a dis-
sent").
158 See Stephanos Bibas, Two Cheers, Not Three, For
40 Washington College of Law Fall 2013
18
Criminal Law Practitioner, Vol. 1 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/3
Criminal Law Practitioner
proach does not fit as comfortably in the au-
topsy case because there is little historical evi-
dence that seems to require confrontation, the
nature of murder prosecution often entails sig-
nificant delays that seriously risk the unavail-
ability of the examiner, autopsy reports cannot
be re-conducted when a prosecution arises,
and cross-examination of examiners is largely
unhelpful they will almost certainly not have
memory of a particular autopsy and is likely
unnecessary to avoid injustices the Confronta-
tion Clause is designed to prevent.5 9
The Court should retreat from the
blind "historical" track it has taken and pro-
vide much-needed clarity to the Confrontation
Clause analysis in cases involving forensic re-
ports this author hopes that the eventual au-
topsy case will present an appropriate and ad-
equate vehicle to do just that.
Sixth Amendment Originalism, 34 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
45, 50-52 (2011).
159 See id. (citing David A. Sklansky, Hearsay 's Last
Hurrah, 2009 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 40).
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